The conventional wisdom is that the formation of patent pools is welfare enhancing when patents are complementary, since the pool avoids a double-marginalization problem associated with independent licensing. This conventional wisdom relies on the effects that pooling has on downstream prices. However, it does not account for the potentially significant role of the effect of pooling on downstream product development and commercialization. We consider development technologies that entail spillovers between rivals and assume that final-demand products are imperfect substitutes. When pool formation facilitates information sharing and spillovers in development, then decreases in the degree of product differentiation can adversely affect welfare by reducing the incentives towards product development and product market competition -even with perfectly complementary patents. The analysis modifies and even negates the conventional wisdom for some settings and suggests why patent pools are uncommon in science-based industries such as biotech and pharmaceuticals that are characterized by tacit knowledge and incomplete patents.
Patent pools and the structure of innovation
In many industries, prominently so in electronics, computer software, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, it has been suggested that innovation has been stifled by a so-called patent-thicket: "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology" (Shapiro 2001, 120) . This has been an integral part of the debate among academics and policymakers concerning the reform of patents and patent law, with arguments ranging from the abolition of intellectual property (IP) rights altogether (e.g. Boldrin and Levine 2009) or limiting patents in certain affected areas (e.g. Heller and Eisenberg 1998) , to cross-licensing or the deliberate bundling of related patents in patent pools (e.g. Clark et al. 2000; Ménière 2008) . In this paper, we consider the latter suggestion by exploring the interplay of IP-licensing and knowledge transfer in product development and commercialization.
A patent pool is an arrangement in which patent holders bundle distinct patents and then collectively license these. The first such combination in the United States was the formation of a patent pool covering patents related to sewing machines in 1856. After initially being viewed as fully protected under the doctrine of freedom of contract, 1 in 1912 the US Supreme Court ruled that patent pools were subject to antitrust scrutiny. 2 Since then a nuanced view of patent pooling has emerged in which "blocking" (complementary) and "competitive" (substitutable) patents are distinguished. Shapiro (2001) notes that when the patents that are included in the pool are perfect complements, a pool should be viewed benignly. The insight rests upon applying Cournot's (1838) analysis of two monopolies providing perfectly complementary inputs to a downstream producer, in which neither of the upstream monopolists incorporates the negative externality that their pricing decision has on the other. 3 The implied (horizontal) double marginalization then results in lower producer and consumer surplus. The analysis was further refined in a general model by Lerner and Tirole (2004) , who also conclude that the more complementary the patents in the pool are, the greater are the welfare benefits
We contend that differences in pool formation across industries are partly explained by idiosyncrasies in development and commercialization processes. In industries such as consumer electronics and computing, obtaining IP-rights is 4 It should be noted that they recognize that, in the context discussed, the notions of complementarity and substitutability are not actually as clear-cut as it might seem, but a meaningful distinction is nonetheless possible on the basis of changes in patentees' willingness to pay for additional patents. 6 See, for instance, the DVD6C patent pool that was formed by nine leading home entertainment companies to foster technology related to digital versatile discs; or the several MPEG patent pools that govern video and audio compression and transmission. 7 For example, the entities that had sequenced the severe acute respiratory syndrome associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) failed to form a pool to facilitate the development of an effective vaccine. Similarly, the development of a DNA microarray to arrange 300 cancer-associated genes would facilitate the diagnosis and possible treatment of many cancers; yet such a DNA chip would require pooling widely dispersed patents, which has not happened. Also, patents on receptors are useful for screening potential pharmaceutical products. To learn as much as possible about the therapeutic effects and side effects of potential products at the pre-clinical stage, firms want to screen products against all known members of relevant receptor families. But when these receptors are patented and controlled by different owners, gathering the necessary licenses may be difficult. See, e.g. USTPO's white paper on the subject, Clark et al. (2000) , Gaulé (2006) , Ménièr (2008) , Verbeure (2009 ), van Zimmeren et al. (2011 ), van Overwalle (2012 or Jeitschko and Zhang (2013) . 8 A rare exception is the current attempt by MPEG-LA's Librassay to institute a genetic diagnostic testing patent pool. It is no coincidence that this is tied to molecular diagnostics testing as here there is a clear commercial application that requires less research (Jeitschko and Zhang 2013) .
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frequently the necessary and sufficient condition to allow for product commercialization. As a result, acquiring the requisite IP-licenses is often the final step before commercialization begins, well after all development is complete.
In biotech and pharmaceuticals, in contrast, securing IP-rights is generally required to be done early in the development process. With many discoveries the pioneer inventions owned by patent holders are "incomplete" and need further innovation before being embodied in a marketable product, resulting in a large divide between foundations knowledge and commercial viability. In addition to patents being incomplete, many relevant discoveries are further characterized by tacit knowledge: " [t] o the extent that the knowledge is both scarce and tacit, it constitutes intellectual human capital retained by the discovering scientist" (Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong 2001, 153) ; so product innovation based on those scientific discoveries must start with the transformation from tacit to codified knowledge, which requires the interaction of the patent holders with the developing firms.
When patents cover incomplete technologies and tacit knowledge, discovering scientists are closely involved in the subsequent development of products and so the formation of a pool also determines how knowledge is transferred from IP-holders (acting in unison) to downstream developers. Pools are then information-sharing institutions: "a patent pool leads to the institutionalized exchange of patented knowledge, as well as technical information not covered by patents through a mechanism for sharing technical information relating to the patented technology, which would otherwise be kept secret. This is reflected by an exchange of know-how brought along by the set-up of a patent pool…" (Van Overwalle 2012 , referencing Verbeure 2009 The implication is that absent a pool the downstream developing firms independently establish the relevant technical knowledge that is required to make use of the combined IP; whereas, when a pool is formed, the combination of the technical information relevant to the use of the patents is done at the level of IP-holders who exchange information and collaborate with one another before delivering this knowhow to the downstream firms. As a result, the pooling structure is conducive to increased spillovers in the subsequent downstream development process and the research trajectories become more congruent, diminishing the degree of product differentiation in the downstream market.
We show that when spillovers in development are prevalent, then decreases in product differentiation can have adverse effects on development efforts. In particular, because a reduction in product differentiation increases downstream competition, firms are incentivized to free-ride off rivals' development efforts. This leads to diminished R&D efforts, resulting in smaller and less profitable downstream markets. These adverse effects can be sufficiently strong to reduce overall welfare -leading to an overturning of the conventional wisdom concerning the pooling of perfectly complementary patents, and providing an explanation for why in the biotech and pharma industries pooling is generally not observed.
There is a nascent literature examining the relationship between patent pooling and R&D and innovation. Dequiedt and Versaevel (2013) show that the anticipation of the formation of a pool of essential patents increases R&D activities prior to pool formation and slows these afterwards; and Llanes and Trento (2012) show in the context of sequential innovation that pools can become instable over time. Looking at R&D after the formation of a pool, Moser (2010, 2012) and Joshi and Nerkar (2011) find empirical evidence to suggest that pool formation reduces further patenting activities. It has been suggested that this is tied to a reduction in competition or free-riding among pool members. This finding is similar to our conclusions, albeit distinct, as we consider downstream development and commercialization of final products, rather than additional upstream IP generation, or the subsequent development of derivative IP.
By expressly considering a product development stage, we depart from the previous literature on patent pooling. And, unlike the extensive literature on research joint ventures, where the focus is on cooperation between competitors who internalize spillovers, avoid cost-duplications and generally coordinate development efforts, our focus is on the pooling decision of upstream IP-holders of complementary patents where their cooperation does not induce any cooperation or coordination among the competing downstream developing firms. Our structure is, thus, similar to Greenlee's (2005) notion of research sharing joint ventures (RSJVs) in which firms agree to share the results of their research, but do not coordinate their efforts. Specifically, Greenlee considers endogenous joint venture sizes and allows the degree of spillovers to vary.
10 From a modelling standpoint, Greenlee's variations in the degree of spillovers are akin to our notion of spillovers tied to patent pool formations, suggesting that the analysis of our model may -to a degree -carry over to RSJVs. Nevertheless, an important distinction between our model of patent pooling and RSJVs is that the pooling decision does not lie in the hands of the firms that undertake the commercialization and then compete in the product market, but rather, it depends on the incentives and interests of the upstream patent holders.
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2 The model and the downstream equilibrium
The model consists of three stages. Prior to the first stage two fundamental discoveries have already been made that resulted in two patents being awarded to two distinct patent holders. In Stage I of the model, these patent holders decide whether they remain independent and non-cooperatively set royalty rates for their patents; or whether they collaborate and form a patent pool -thereby exchanging more detailed information on their discoveries and then jointly determine the royalty rate for access to both patents. In Stage II, downstream firms acquire access to the relevant IP and undertake costly efforts to develop differentiated products. This development effort is characterized by spillovers in research. Finally, in Stage III, the developing firms engage in differentiated products price competition in the downstream final-demand market. 
Stage I: pool formation
Stage I begins after foundation research has already been completed and two patents have been awarded to two distinct patent holders, k and l. Both patents cover incomplete technology and tacit knowledge that is relevant for the subsequent development and commercialization of a downstream product: that is, the two patents constitute perfectly complementary inputs. The patent holders can either remain independent and license their patents and engage in the relevant knowledge transfer and ideas exchange to downstream developers independently; or they can pool their patents.
In the case of pool formation the patent holders share their knowhow with each other to coordinate their knowledge transfer to and collaboration with downstream licensees. The exchange of knowledge between the patent holders has cross-pollination effects that are otherwise absent, because without a pool there is no direct contact between patent holders regarding their incomplete technologies and tacit knowledge (Van Overwalle 2012; Verbuere 2009 ). The decision to pool then also affects the subsequent flow of information with the downstream licensees. Because the knowledge transfer from IP-holders to downstream firms is coordinated, development insights gained with downstream firms are readily transferred back to the pool members and then further disseminated between researchers. 13 The end result is that spillovers in the development stage (Stage II) are augmented when a pool was formed. And, because research starting points and subsequent trajectories become more similar, the products that are sold in the final-demand market (Stage III) are more similar to one another. Downstream firms are charged per-unit-of-output royalty rates, denoted by R. This is the prevalent type of contract found in pools (Serafino 2007) , because it avoids the need to estimate the commercial viability of the developed products ex ante and preserves the IP-holders interest in the subsequent commercial success. Moreover, compared to a flat upfront licensing fee, the per-unit royalty rate reduces downstream output and increases prices and profits. Absent a pool, each patent holder independently (non-cooperatively) sets a royalty rate for each of the downstream firms, whereas a uniform royalty rate for the downstream firms is agreed upon between the patent holders when they have formed a pool.
Since our focus is on the welfare implications of pool formation in light of its effects on development and product market competition, we preclude the possibility of strategic foreclosure (e.g. the deliberate creation of monopoly in the final-demand market by excluding all but one downstream firm from access to the patents). Such foreclosure would be the subject of independent antitrust concerns, and in both European and US jurisprudence patent pools are subject to non-discrimination rules.
Stages II and III: product development and commercialization
Much of the literature on IP-licensing and patent pools assumes either a monopoly or a perfectly competitive downstream market. Both of these polar extremes obscure important aspects of downstream activities. The former fails to recognize important trade-offs that exist in the degree of product differentiation among rival downstream firms, while the latter fails to appreciate how downstream market interactions affect development efforts of the firms. We capture both of these important aspects by assuming that there are two imperfectly competitive downstream firms i and j poised to develop and market a product based on the two patents. In Stage III, firms engage in (non-cooperative) differentiated goods price competition. Inverse demand for each firm's product is
where γ is the degree of product differentiation, with γ ¼ 1 yielding perfect substitutes, and γ ¼ 0 representing independent monopolies. Because with pool formation the patent holders exchange information about their tacit knowledge, and because they further coordinate their knowledge transfer to the downstream firms, the starting points for product development become more similar. This leads to congruent research trajectories, resulting in a lower degree of product differentiation.
14 Formally, we let γ ¼ γ x 2 fγ p ; γ n g, with 1 > γ p ! γ n > 0 where p denotes the case that a pool has been formed, and n that patent holders operate independently. A i is the base demand, or market size, for firm i's product. Its size depends on efforts e expended in development (Stage II). This effort may be jointly applied by the patent holder/scientist and the researchers/developers in the firm. However, since the outside patent holders in such instances are generally fully compensated for their efforts (see, e.g. Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (2001) , esp. 167), the cost of effort only enters the firms' objective function.
where β denotes the degree of spillovers in development, measuring how much effort exerted at firm j's labs is captured and appropriated by firm i. When IP-holders have formed a pool and the patent holders coordinate their ongoing knowledge transfer to the downstream firms, this has cross-pollination 14 Ghosh and Morita (2012) also study possible trade-offs concerning development collaboration and product differentiation, using a circular city model with a focus on how insiders differ from outsiders. Bourreau and Doğan (2010) allow for cost sharing in development and study how increased collaboration in development leads to diminished product differentiation. However, effort is not part of the development process. In contrast to these approaches that postulate a positive relationship between collaboration and product similarity, Lin and Saggi (2002) consider the case where firms coordinate to increase product differentiation.
effects that increase the amount of spillovers that are experienced between the firms. Therefore we assume β ¼ β x 2 fβ p ; β n g, with 1 ! β p ! β n ! 0.
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Firms face a quadratic cost of effort in development and for simplicity we assume that the only production costs are associated with acquiring IP. Thus, the marginal cost is given by the royalty rates the firms pay, R; all other variable or fixed costs are normalized to zero.
The sequence of events characterizing the structure of innovation and competition is the basis for Figure 1 .
Pooling:
Stage II:
Firms i and j exert efforts, e. Spillovers β occur.
Stage III:
Firms compete in market. Product differentiation is given by γ.
Stage I: Patent holders k and l make pooling decision. 
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The effect of the degree of product differentiation on development efforts has also been examined elsewhere, with some models specifically examining endogenous product differentiation. Amir, Evstigneev, and Wooders (2003) use generic profit functions and consider differences between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D. As for the interplay of effort and spillovers in development, Moltó, Georgantzís, and Orts (2005) have a closed-form model with a result that is similar to one of ours (albeit in a very different set-up) in that the social planner may wish to limit the extent of spillovers in development, as these lead to under-performance due to free-riding.
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Benchmark equilibrium
We seek the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and solve the model through backward induction. We first consider the product market competition for a generic degree of product homogeneity γ x , and arbitrary demand intercepts, A i and A j . Thereafter we analyse development efforts for generic spillovers β x . The analysis is conducted from firm i's point of view, which is without loss of generality as firms are symmetric. Detailed derivations of the model, which are standard, albeit somewhat involved, are found in Appendix A.
All production costs apart from licensing expenses, given by the (per-unit) royalty rates R, are normalized to zero, so firm i's objective is to choose a price to maximize
where
The equilibrium solution to this gives market profits as a function of the demand intercepts A i and A j , i.e. π (2), these depend on the firms' effort levels, A i ¼ a þ e i þ β x e j . With quadratic effort costs, the firm's Stage-II objective is
The first-order conditions yield the best response functions 16 ; and, defining
This results in equilibrium firm output of
We now consider Stage I and determine the optimal royalty rates. For the case of a pool, the patent holders' objective is to choose a royalty rate R p that maximizes
Absent a pool, both patent holders independently choose a royalty rate, r k and r l . Since the patents are essential (i.e. perfectly complementary) each of the downstream firms contract with and pay royalties to both patent holders so that unit costs are
The equilibrium royalty rates are, thus, r Ã ¼ ð1=3Þa so that
Letting Å and CS denote industry profits and consumer surplus in the downstream market and V the payoff to upstream IP-holders,
Assuming that pooling affect neither spillovers nor the degree of product differentiation, so that β and γ are unaffected by pool formation, it is straightforward to show that regardless of the size of spillovers in subsequent product development and independent of the degree of the resulting product differentiation, consumer surplus, market profit, licensing revenue and hence total welfare are all strictly greater with pooling. The insight follows readily: royalty revenue, given by eq. (11), is maximized at R Ã p , so patent holder payoffs are lower when there is no pool compared to the case where there is a pool. Notice further from eqs (9) and (10) that firm profit and consumer surplus are decreasing in R. Hence, since R Ã n ¼ ð2=3Þa > ð1=2Þa ¼ R Ã p , firm profit and consumer surplus, in addition to patent holder payoffs, are all higher under pool formation when compared to the absence of a pool. This is the double marginalization, or "royalty stacking," that reflects the negative externalities that are not accounted for when royalty rates are set independently across perfectly complementary inputs.
With this in mind, we now consider how welfare measures are affected when the pooling process affects the downstream development of products and impacts their degree of differentiation.
Spillover and differentiation effects
A first step in the discussion of the interactions between pooling, development efforts and product differentiation is to consider how marginal changes in Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling spillovers and product differentiation affect the welfare of consumers, downstream firms and patent holders.
Where the academic literature on patent pools addresses efficiency, total welfare is generally used as the standard for assessing the best structure for licensing patents. In the benchmark case, any further differentiation between welfare measures leads to the same insights as an exclusive focus on total welfare, so any separate evaluation of payoffs to producers or patent holders or consumers does not lead to any additional insight regarding the desirability of pooling. However, in the presence of spillover and differentiation effects, this is no longer necessarily the case and it needs to be determined when disparate measures of welfare are in congruence and when they are in conflict when it comes to evaluating the formation of patent pools.
A direct consideration of patent holder payoffs indicates when the formation of pools might be initiated by patent holders. Industry profit is relevant in this context as this will indicate in which circumstances the industry would lobby for or against policies that facilitate the formation of pools. Consumer surplus is also pertinent for our analysis, since, in contrast to much academic literature, antitrust practice often views consumer welfare as the guiding criterion that is to be considered when evaluating a given policy.
Spillover effects
We first consider the impact of changes in the amount of spillovers in development. Specifically, we determine the marginal payoff implications of changes in spillovers for arbitrary constellations of initial spillovers and fixed levels of product differentiation.
Ceteris paribus, increasing the spillover effect increases welfare by generating a greater demand base A. Hence, all else equal, patent holders view increased spillovers favourably. However, ceteris non paribus: When considering the impact that spillovers in the development process have on optimal effort choices, the degree of product differentiation plays a critical role.
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Lemma 1 Equilibrium effort at the development stage is increasing in the amount of spillovers if products are strongly differentiated, but decreasing if products are similar. Specifically, there exists a threshold function S e such that
The intuition here is straightforward. Strong spillovers bestow a positive externality on a firm's rival. If the rival is a close competitor, i.e. γ > S e , then firms recognize a larger negative impact on their profits from the rival's strength. That is, π Ã i is decreasing in γA j , so for γ sufficiently large, firms reduce the amount of effort applied to the development process if spillovers increase. This negative effect can be sufficiently strong so that increases in the spillovers in development actually have negative effects on equilibrium base demands as measured by the demand intercept A Ã .
Lemma 2 When products are sufficiently homogenous, increased spillovers reduce the market size. Specifically, there exists a function S A with S A > S e such that dA
The two critical thresholds for the degree of product differentiation are depicted in Figure 2 , with positive relations between the variables and changes in spillovers occurring to the left of the lines.
As a result of Lemma 2, firms prefer increased spillovers only if the degree of product homogeneity is sufficiently small. Proposition 1 Unless spillovers are very large and products are close substitutes, increased spillovers are beneficial for firms. That is, there exists a function S Å > 0:85 such that Figure 3 illustrates the combinations of product differentiation and inherent spillovers referenced in the proposition, with increased spillovers being beneficial below S Å . Per-unit royalty payments divorce the patent holders' incentives from those of the firms, as the firms' objectives are profits, whereas the patent holders' interests are tied to the level of output. As a result, firms benefit more on the margin from increased spillovers compared to patent holders, due to the fact that firms benefit from the reduced effort costs associated with lower efforts when goods are more substitutable (Lemma 1), whereas the patent holders benefit from increased output associated with increases in the base market size; that is, Q, given in eq. (6), is increasing in A.
The same intuition for preferring increased spillovers also applies to consumers. In fact, when a given royalty contract is in place, patent holders' interests in terms of increased spillovers are perfectly aligned with those of consumers and they coincide with the threshold characterized in Lemma 2.
Proposition 2 Unless products are close substitutes an increase in spillovers is beneficial for a given royalty rate for patent holders and also for consumers. In particular, there exists a function S V;CS , with S V;CS ¼ S A such that
The critical dividing line is again depicted in Figure 3 , with increased spillovers being beneficial below and to the left of S V;CS . In light of the discrepancy between firms' and consumers' interests, with the patent holders' interests aligning with those of the latter, it is instructive which interests weigh more when looking at total welfare. As one expects, the effect of changed spillovers on total welfare lies (necessarily) between those of firms and consumers, being closer to consumers. Proposition 3 Unless products are close substitutes, the spillover effect makes pooling more attractive from a total welfare perspective. That is, there exists a function S TW with S V;CS < S TW < S Å , such that
The overall conclusion from this discussion is that in isolation, that is, absent differentiation effects, spillover effects tend to be beneficial provided that products are sufficiently differentiated.
Differentiation effects
We now consider the impact of marginal decreases in product differentiation for given degrees of spillovers in development. Again, a critical feature in understanding distinct welfare effects of changes in product differentiation is to understand firms' incentives to provide effort at the development stage.
In contrast to changes in spillovers, the effect of marginal changes in the degree of product differentiation on equilibrium development effort is unambiguous and therefore also results in an unambiguous effect on the products' base market size A.
Lemma 3 Irrespective of the degree of spillovers in development, equilibrium effort, and hence equilibrium base market size, is decreasing in the degree of product homogeneity, that is,
The intuition is straightforward. As γ increases, products become more similar and product market competition becomes more fierce, which decreases the returns on investment in development efforts. This, in turn, adversely affects the firm's profit. Formally, Proposition 4 Increases in the degree of product homogeneity adversely affect firms' profits, regardless of the degree of spillovers in development:
Proposition 4 shows that despite resulting in effort cost savings due to diminished efforts, increases in γ translate into fiercer product market competition to such a degree that firms are worse off overall as γ increases. However, while firms eschew fiercer competition, if this translates into increased output, then per-unit royalty-charging patent holders may actually benefit from decreases in product differentiation. Similarly, even if products become less differentiated, consumers also might benefit on net from less product differentiation and increased competition if this increases output and reduces prices sufficiently. Indeed, this may, but need not be the case. Figure 4 depicts the regions in which decreased differentiation is beneficial, which is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When spillovers are sufficiently large, then both patent holders and consumers are made worse off by increases in product homogeneity. Specifically, there exist functions D V and D CS with
The reason that royalty-charging patent holders and consumers may not find the differentiation effect desirable is because of the equilibrium incentives to exert effort in the development process. Due to Lemma 3, if spillovers in the development process are large, then the adverse effect of diminished effort results in a reduction in equilibrium output Q Ã , which negatively impacts consumers' and patent holders' interests. Otherwise, if spillovers are sufficiently small (provided γ is not too small), patent holders and consumers benefit from the differentiation effect. The reason that consumers more readily favour differentiation effects compared to patent holders despite decreases in product variety, is because the consumers' benefits from increased output due to more competition is reenforced by lower prices as well. Patent holders, in contrast, care only about output and not prices.
Consider now the question of what the overall welfare implications of the differentiation effect is, which, it turns out, depends on product differentiation and spillovers not being too small. Proposition 6 Decreases in product differentiation are only beneficial from a total welfare perspective when spillovers are small and products are fairly close substitutes to begin with. Thus, there exists
Thus, even when consumers and patent holders benefit from the increased competition brought about by the differentiation effect, this can be more than offset by reductions in profits. That is, once one accounts for the effort incentives in development, total welfare decreases in product differentiation whenever differentiation is not too small and spillovers not too large.
Welfare effects of patent pools
We now evaluate the overall incentives to pool and derive the welfare implications of patent pooling. Setting aside for the moment the distortions caused by royalty stacking, some insights can be gleaned from the previous analysis.
Of the three market participants -patent holders, firms and consumers -the direction of marginal welfare effects are most sensitive to spillovers and product differentiation when it comes to consumers, and least so when it comes to firms, with patent holders in between. That is, whether consumers benefit or suffer on the margin from either of the effects generally depends on the degree of spillovers and the degree of product differentiation, whereas for firms most constellations of parameters have the same implications concerning the marginal impact of the effects. In particular, firms largely benefit from increases in spillovers (Proposition 1) and decreases in product homogeneity (Proposition 4) -so the effects operate in opposite directions.
The only exception to two incentives moving in opposite directions for the firms is the boundary case identified in Proposition 1. Indeed, since here the firms' critical threshold on the parameter values is entirely encased by that of consumers and patent holders, this also yields the only unambiguous welfare prediction concerning the marginal effects of pooling on subsequent research and commercialization. In particular then, if the degree of product differentiation is small and spillovers in development are sufficiently high, then firms, consumers and patent holders are all adversely affected on the margin by spillover and differentiation effects tied to pooling.
Underlying the result is that when there are large degrees of spillovers in development then for relatively homogenous products there is a lot of free-riding in the development process. As a result, increases in spillovers and increases in product homogeneity actually reduce overall development efforts to the detriment of all involved.
Of course, the central argument concerning pool formation is the avoidance of double marginalization and royalty stacking.
18 So even if there are adverse marginal effects of pool formation due to differentiation and spillover effects, these may be more than offset by infra-marginal effects stemming from altered royalty pricing that the pool structure induces. From this follows a necessary condition for pool formation to have adverse effects overall.
Theorem 1 A necessary condition for pooling to be welfare reducing is that pooling leads to large spillovers in development and that the resulting products are relatively close substitutes.
The following example illustrates overall welfare loses due to pooling despite the pooling structure leading to an avoidance of double marginalization. Spillovers in development are assumed to be large and products remain highly differentiated absent the pooling structure, but become relatively undifferentiated under pool formation.
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Example 1 Let β n ¼ 0:8 and γ n ¼ 0:1, so there are large spillovers in development and products are highly differentiated. Then there exists γ p sufficiently large (viz., γ n =γ p small), such that pooling reduces total welfare. Indeed, for β p ! β n and γ p > γ n , there exist R TW , such that
The threshold function R TW is depicted as the dashed line in Figure 5 . As indicated above, the mechanism that drives the result is that the strong increase in product homogeneity induced by working off similar research trajectories (large increase in γ due to pooling) results in firms facing much fiercer product 18 A more detailed analysis of spillover and differentiation effects that abstracts from the issue of royalty stacking is in Jeitschko and Zhang (2011) . 19 The examples were calculated and the figures were generated using Mathematica ® . The associated files are available from the authors upon request. market competition. In isolation this may be good for patent holders and consumers. However, the potential benefits are affected by free-riding in research efforts because of large spillovers in research (large β). Indeed, when products are close substitutes and there are large spillovers in R&D, then this reduces equilibrium R&D efforts to such a degree to lead to smaller market sizes, resulting in an overall reduction in welfare. The thresholds for desiring pooling from the firms' and the patent holders' perspectives are also depicted in Figure 5 , using analogous notation. It is worth noting that a corresponding line delineating where consumers are worse off does not exist for this example. This is no coincidence. It turns out that because of the strong distortions that independently set royalty rates have on prices, consumers unambiguously prefer the pool formation, independent of the degree of product differentiation and the amount of spillovers in development and independent of the magnitude of spillover and differentiation effects. Formally, using Mathematica's FindInstance function, one obtains: Theorem 2 The pooling of perfectly complementary patents always generate an increase in consumer surplus compared to when patent holders remain independent, that is, CS p > CS n ; "β n ; β p ; γ n ; γ p :
This is an important finding from an antitrust perspective, where often consumer surplus is used as the deciding policy guide. Thus, absent any other concerns tied to pool formation, regulators who vie (only) to protect consumer surplus should view the pooling of complementary patents benignly, even if this has negative effects on the margin concerning research and commercialization.
However, as Example 1 already illustrates, the benefits tied to the elimination of royalty stacking need not be strong enough to offset concerns that other market participants have. That is, the picture is more nuanced for firms and, more importantly, in terms of the patent holders' interests as well. As was shown, the differentiation effect makes pooling less attractive for firms (Proposition 4), and if spillovers are large then the spillover effect may also make pooling less profitable (Proposition 1). Analogous considerations exist for patent holders as well (see Propositions 5 and 2). Thus, it is typically the case that for firms or patent holders to refrain from pooling, differentiation effects must be present. However, as the following rather typical example demonstrates, these do not have to be as dramatic as they are in Example 1.
Example 2 Let β n ¼ 0:5 and γ n ¼ 0:5 so products are moderately differentiated and there are noticeable spillovers in development. Now consider spillover and differentiation effects such that β p > β n and γ p > γ n , then there exist functions R Å and R V , with R Å > R V , such that
Example 2 is illustrated in Figure 6 . The intuition for why patent holders and firms may eschew patent pools is similar to that in Example 1. But notice that as differentiation effects are smaller now and spillovers are also smaller than in Example 1, the adverse welfare effects for patent holders and firms are not strong enough to overcome the benefits that consumers have from pooling. Hence, overall welfare is larger with a pool.
Some comparisons of the cases reflected in the two examples are instructive. First, note that with regard to firms' preferences, for the given levels of spillovers in development, differentiation effects alone can lead to firms preferring the non-pool structure. That is, even if β p ¼ β n , there are differentiation effects that are strong enough (viz., γ n =γ p small enough) such that profits are higher without a pool. This, of course, is a result of the intensified market competition that the firms face in the downstream market, due to differentiation effects. This result also suggests that if the patent holders are practicing entities (so that their incentives are more closely aligned with those of firms), then they are less likely to favour pooling in these cases.
Second, note that in Example 1 whenever firms prefer the non-pooling structure, then so do the patent holders; whereas in Example 2 the reverse is true: patent holders prefer non-pooling only if firms also do. The reason for this discrepancy is tied to the differentiation effect being much larger, coupled with larger spillovers in development in Example 1 compared to Example 2. While a loss of differentiation on its own is good for patent holders (because it raises competitive pressures and increases output), it has the negative side effect of reducing development efforts (which decrease market size and therefore decrease market output). Because spillovers are so large in Example 1, this latter negative effect outweighs any gains from fiercer product competition, precisely because it is the fierce product market competition that induces the firms to freeride off each other in the development process. For the same reason (and now turning to Example 2), unless there is also a substantial spillover effect (β n =β p small) that leads to very large spillovers and then induces free-riding, patent holders will always prefer to pool and reap the benefits of more intense product competition in situations similar to Example 2.
In sum, the adverse implications of royal stacking on prices lead consumers always to prefer the pooling structure for perfectly complementary patents. However, if differentiation effects are very strong resulting in little product differentiation and if there are large spillovers in development with a pool, then overall welfare can be diminished as a result of the formation of a pool. This is due to the fact that fierce market competition coupled with large spillovers in development lead to free-riding in research -which adversely affects development efforts to the detriment of the subsequent market size, which reduces output and profit. Whether firms or patent holders are more readily adversely affected by pooling depends on the degree of spillovers and the degree of differentiation effects, as firms benefit from saving of research efforts where patent holders do not, and patent holders benefit from larger output in fiercer market competition whereas firms do not. For this reason it requires large differentiation effects that are compounded by large spillovers to have both patent holders and firms prefer the nonpooling structure.
Conclusions
In the debate about overcoming the so-called "patent-thicket," patent pooling has been seen as a possible solution, provided that patents placed in the pool are complementary. This conventional wisdom -present in the academic literature, in policy circles and antitrust practice -relies on static price effects tied to royalty stacking, but overlooks potential implications of pool formation for dynamic innovation in downstream product development and commercialization. Largely missing from the debate is the potential impact of patent pooling on the transfer of embodied and tacit knowledge on the subsequent development and commercialization process.
We begin to fill this gap by considering a model in which perfectly complementary patents are incomplete and tacit knowledge needs to be transferred in the licensing process -features that are present in biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry. Forming pools for scientific discoveries results in patent holding scientists becoming more connected; providing opportunities for information sharing -which has been cited as a reason to establish patent pools in biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry. However, precisely because the pool serves as an information-sharing device, the formation of a pool increases spillovers in subsequent product development and decreases the degree of product differentiation in the final product market. And once the development incentives of the downstream firms are accounted for in light of this, patent pools -even for perfectly complementary patents -may be welfare decreasing, since they can reduce downstream firms' return on development efforts.
In particular, we find that if there are large spillovers in development, and if pooling leads to a large reduction in the degree of product differentiation in the downstream market, then total welfare decreases when pools are formed. This is because the increase in product market competition reduces development effort incentives, and this free-riding in research is compounded by large spillovers in development -resulting in a smaller downstream market with less output and welfare.
Nevertheless, there are many constellations for which pools are beneficial. Indeed, if consumer surplus is the relevant criterion for antitrust sanctioning, the pooling structure is always preferred, regardless of the degree of spillovers and product differentiation and how pooling affects these, because the double marginalization of independently set royalty rates has such a pronounced effect on prices.
The model demonstrates that the welfare implications of pooling complementary patents is sensitive to industry specifics, and general policy recommendations based solely on the complementarity of patents ought to be avoided.
Although the conventional wisdom may prevail in industries such as consumer electronics where spillovers and product differentiation are not affected by pooling; it may fail in industries such as biotech and pharmaceuticals, where knowledge transfer creates spillover and differentiation effects tied to pooling.
Indeed, citing two surveys in the medical biotechnology sector, Van Overwalle (2012) reports that for most respondents an important reason not to form a pool is the fear of loss of secrecy and control, which is in line with the anticipation of free-riding due to spillovers and reduced profits due to diminished product differentiation. These concerns suggest that in order for pools to successfully form, patent holders and licensees need to find mechanisms to control spillover and differentiation effects in the development and commercialization process. Yet, any such mechanisms would be cause for added antitrust scrutiny.
Instead, it might be advisable to periodically review the suitability of potential pooling, since over time tacit knowledge becomes codified and disseminates more widely, mooting some of the concerns tied to loss of secrecy and loss of control. In the meantime there is evidence to suggest that innovators in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are able to navigate the patent-thicket problem without pool structures. Thus, Katznelson and Howells (2013) note that there are substantial clinical and economic benefits tied to design-around activities in pharmaceuticals.
Appendix A: Derivations
The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of this game yields:
which implies
Note also that
So, from eqs (27) and (28) one obtains profit of 
Substituting the equilibrium effort level (eq. 5) into the firm's payoff (eq. 4) yields 
To derive consumer surplus in the market, we use the representative consumer's preferences that underlie the demand structure UðQ i ; Q j Þ ¼ A i Q i þ A j Q j À ðQ 2 i þ 2γQ i Q j þ Q 2 j Þ=2(see Singh and Vives 1984) . For the symmetric equilibrium, this reduces to
Substituting eq. (5) into eq. (2) gives
Further substitution into eq. (26) yields
Using eqs (32) and (33) results in
Consumer surplus is gross utility minus expenditures, i.e. CS Ã :¼ U Ã À P Ã 2Q Ã , so, using eqs (31) 
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Equilibrium effort is given by eq. (5). After taking the derivative, dropping the denominator and consolidating it follows that de Of the three factors it is straightforward to show that the first is negative and the third is positive. The middle factor is shown to be positive in the proof to Proposition 1, from which it follows that dÅ Ã dγ < 0.
□
Proof of Proposition 5
We undertake the same steps as in the proof to Proposition 2, but now take derivatives with respect to γ. From this it follows that dV dγ has the same sign as
Setting this equal to 0 and solving for β yields
Similarly one derives that dCS dγ has the same sign as where
E ¼ 608 À 576γ À 1; 296γ 2 þ 1; 096γ 3 þ 794γ 4 À 636γ 5 À 185γ 6 þ 147γ 7 þ 15γ 8 À 12γ 9 ;
F ¼ 36BCD À 432EB 2 À 2C 3 þ 288AEC À 108AD 2 ; and 
□
Proof of Theorem 1 For given product differentiation and spillovers in development, the pooling of patents eliminates double marginalization and increases welfare. Therefore a necessary condition for overall welfare to nonetheless decrease is that spillover effects and differentiation effects must be on net negative, which is only the case when pooling is undesirable without double marginalization.
Proof of Theorem 2 Setting γ p ¼ 0:85 (i.e. the bounds under which the secondorder conditions hold) and β p ¼ 1 Mathematica's FindInstance[fCS p < CS n ; 0 < γ n < 0:85; 0 < β n < 1g; fγ n ; β n g] shows that no such instance exists on the given domain. Since consumer surplus is concave, it then follows that the theorem holds for the entire domain.
□
